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1. Introduction
Many studies on international commodity market intervention con-
centrate on the policy's impact on country groups, such as the
exporting countries or the developing countries (e.g. Behrman,
1978a; Behrman, 1978b; Nguyen, 1980). Only a few studies empha-
size that national impacts may differ significantly from the
aggregate impact (for exceptions, see Koester, 1979; Lord, 1981;
Newbery/Stiglitz, 1981, section 20). These studies,- however,
focus only on buffer stocks and on a purely price-stabilizing
mechanism. Moreover, they analyze national impacts from a theo-
retical ex-ante point of view. In assuming a hypothetically func-
tioning stabilization agreement, they do not provide sufficient
insight into the economics of existing commodity agreements. The
International Coffee Agreement (ICA), which is analyzed here, is
not a pure stabilization mechanism but raises prices and includes
redistributive elements. Additionally, it is based on export
quotas and not on buffer stocks.
This article shows how national interests in price-changing
international commodity agreements can be measured. Two ap-
proaches are distinguished. Firstly, changes in national
interests can be measured that are caused by the introduction of
an international commodity agreement in an otherwise unregulated
world market. This approach is based on a comparison of the
situations with and without a commodity agreement. It represents
a positive approach to measuring national interests. Secondly,
changes in national interests can be measured that result from
the individual country's decision to participate in the agreement
or to stay outside. This approach compares the situation of par-
ticipation with that of non-participation in an existing commo-
dity agreement. As the consequences of a national decision are
analyzed, it is a normative or decision-oriented approach to
measuring national interests. The ICA is a particularly interest-
ing scheme to show the two approaches, as some countries parti-
cipate in the agreement while others do not. This has led to the
co-existence of a controlled and an uncontrolled market with dif-
ferent prices.— 2 —
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some basic
information about the rules of the ICA. Section 3 presents the
theoretical basis for the positive and the decision-oriented
approach of measuring national interests in this agreement. In
section 4, national interests of individual importing member
countries, importing non-member countries and exporting member
countries in the ICA are computed using data for 1982 and 1983.
In section 5, the sensitivity of the results with respect to
various assumptions is discussed. The results are summarized in
section 6, where proposals for future research are given, too.- 3 -
2. Basic Rules of the 1983 International Coffee Agreement
The ICA of 1983 has the same stated objectives as the preceding
agreements . It is supposed, among other objectives, to
avoid excessive fluctuations in the levels of world sup-
plies, stocks and prices which are harmful to both producers
and consumers (Art. 1, § 2);
increase the purchasing power of coffee-exporting countries
(Art. 1, § 4).
Hereby, a stabilizing and a redistributive function is attributed
to the ICA. The redistributive element is to be created by in-
creasing consumption and by realizing prices that are renumera-
tive to producers, fair to consumers and lead to a long-term
equilibrium between production and consumption (Art. 1, §§ 1 and
4).
With respect to its long lifetime, the ICA is often evaluated as
rather successful (e.g., Vogt 1984, p. 25). This positive eva-
luation is based on the stabilizing role of the agreement. How-
ever, the ICA is based on an export quota policy which is suit-
able for price support rather than for pure price stabilization.
It includes a mechanism to increase prices, as exports in the
regulated market can be restricted. It does not include, however,
a mechanism for lowering prices in boom periods. There is no in-
strument available to enforce export quantities in the coffee
market that are higher than voluntary exports. Therefore, the
quota scheme is not a price-stabilization device that can reduce
price fluctuations in both directions around an equilibrium
2
price , but is mainly a redistributive policy instrument that
increases the world market price in periods of depression .
Chart 1 contains detailed information on the major rules of the
1983 ICA. The basic elements of the export quota policy are:- 4 -








ty of the quota
scheme:
If the quota rule is in effect, the Coffee Council will
set an annual global quota for all the exporting member
countries. Annual country quotas are also set according to
the following rule. The quotas for exporting member coun-
tries entitled to a basic quota shall have a fixed and a
variable part (Art. 35, § 2) . The fixed part shall corre-
spond to 70% of the global annual quota and the variable
part to 30%. The fixed part of the national quota, the
basic quota, is fixed by the International Coffee Council
(Art. 30, § 2). The variable part shall be distributed
over exporting members in the proportion of verified na-
tional stocks to the total verified stocks of all export-
ing member countries (Art. 35, § 2). Sane smaller export-
ing members are not entitled to a basic quota. The sum of
their annual quotas shall be 4.2% of the annual global
export quota and the shares for national quotas are fixed
(Art. 31, § 2; Annex 2). Burundi and Rwanda have annual
export quotas fixed in absolute terms (Art. 31, § 6).
Quotas continue to be in effect and are suspended accord-
ing to the difference between the composite indicator
price and target prices fixed by the Coffee Council (Art.
33, §§ 1,2; Art. 38, §§ 1,2). The composite indicator
price is defined as the arithmetic mean of the indicator
prices for other Arabicas and Robustas, e.g. quotas con-
tinue to be in effect at the commencement of the coffee
year if the fifteen-day moving average of the composite
indicator price is at or below the highest price for the
upward adjustment of quotas in the price range established
for the preceding coffee year.
The quota regulations are controlled at the border of the
importing member country. Each export of coffee by members
shall be covered by a valid certificate of origin (Art.
43, § 1). Re-exports have to be covered by a valid certi-
ficate of re-export (Art. 43, § 2). If quotas are in ef-
fect, members shall prohibit the import of any shipment of
coffee which is not accompanied by a valid certificate of
origin (Art. 47, § 7) . Exempt from this rule is the so-
called "tourist coffee" (Art. 47, § 8).
The world coffee market is separated into a member market
and a non-member market (Art. 29). There are no quotas for
exporting members in the non-member market (Art. 44, § 1).
Whenever quotas are in effect, each member shall limit its
annual imports from non-member countries to an average
level of past years (Art. 45, § 1).
a The provisions are supposed to show a broad picture of the ICA from 1983.
There are qualifications to be made on individual rules which can be found
in the agreement's text.
Source: Own compilation on the basis of International Coffee Organization
(1982), passim.- 5 -
1. The International Coffee Council will set a global annual
export quota as well as annual and quarterly export quotas
for exporting member countries, if the composite price for
coffee is lower than a specified price level. The quotas are
valid for the market of the importing member countries. The
importing member countries control the export quota scheme
at their borders on the basis of certificates of origin.
2. The international coffee market is separated by the quota
regulation into a controlled and an uncontrolled market. No
quota rule is enforced for the market of non-member import-
ing countries. There is only an indirect sanction for sell-
ing oversupply to the uncontrolled market as these deals
lower, ceteris paribus, the future variable part of the
export quota in the regulated market.- 6 -
3. Theoretical Basis for Measuring National Interests in a
Price-changing Commodity Agreement
If national interests in an international commodity agreement are
to be measured, the determinants of national interests have to be
specified first. It is assumed here that national interests will
be influenced if the realization of national economic objectives
is affected by the agreement. National interests will be identi-
fied in welfare terms and in financial terms. Firstly, it is as-
sumed that the national interests of a country will be positively
(negatively) influenced if its economic welfare increases (de-
creases) due to the agreement. Secondly, it is assumed that the
national interests of a country will be positively (negatively)
influenced if its import expenditures decrease (increase) or its
export earnings increase (decrease). Only those welfare and fi-
nancial impacts are taken into account which arise from the
agreement's effect on the price level and the consequential ef-
fects on trade of the regulated commodity.
3.1 A positive approach to measuring national interests
International commodity agreements in which only some countries
participate lead to a market separation between a controlled and
an uncontrolled market, usually with different market prices.
Abstracting from quality and transport cost differences, a hypo-
thetical situation without agreement would be characterized by a
uniform world market price. The positive approach to measuring
national interests compares these situations with and without the
commodity agreement from a national point of view.
Let us analyze the national interests of three different coun-
tries: an importing member country, an importing non-member coun-
4
try, and an exporting member country. The welfare impact of an
international commodity agreement on the importing member country
can be measured as
(1) AW± = p/
P* ID± (p) dp < 0, if pM I p*.- 7 -
The welfare impact on the importing non-member country is
(2) AW = /
P*ID. (p) dp I 0, if p I p*,
J PN J
and the welfare impact on the exporting member country is
(3) AWk = (pM - p*)5k - /
P* {ES*k (p) - qk} dp
{ESNk (p) } dp.
AW symbolizes the absolute change in economic welfare, M the
member market, and N the non-member market, i indicates an indi-
vidual importing member country, j an individual importing non-
member country, and k an individual exporting country, p is a
price, q, is the fixed national export quota, ID is an import
demand curve, and ES is an export supply curve. * symbolizes the
hypothetical situation without agreement. pM - is the market
price at which the exporting country would supply the national
export quota voluntarily.
The financial impact of the agreement on the importing member
country is
(4) AI± = PM qJ
D - p* q™* ,





(5) Aij = pN qj - p* qj
The financial impact on the exporting country which sells both to
the controlled and the uncontrolled market is:
,,. ._ - ^ ES * ES* (6) AEk = pM qk + pN qNk - p* qR ._ Q _
I is import expenditures, E is export earnings, q is the im-
ported quantity, and q is the exported quantity. All other
symbols remain unchanged.
The positive approach to measuring national interests in inter-
national commodity agreements compares the situation with agree-
ment with the hypothetical situation without agreement. It is the
traditional way of measuring national impacts of an international
policy measure. However, the traditional approach mostly does not
contain the relevant comparison from a decision-oriented point of
view of an individual country. Given an existing international
commodity agreement, a country cannot usually restore the situa-
tion of a liberalized world market by itself. Analogously, in the
case of a liberalized world market, the individual country will
usually not be in the position of introducing an international
commodity agreement by itself. Hence, the positive approach is
mainly a tool of descriptive policy analysis by comparing an
existing situation with a hypothetical situation that is exo-
genous to the country.
3.2 A decision-oriented approach to measuring national interests
The second approach to measuring national interests takes a deci-
sion-oriented viewpoint. Given an existing international commo-
dity agreement, a country can decide whether it wants to partici-
pate in the agreement or not. The decision-oriented approach
compares the realization of national objectives with and without
participation in the agreement.
The welfare impact arising from the decision to participate in
the agreement for the importing member country i can be measured
as
P*
(7) AW± = /
 N IDi (p) dp 1 0, if pM I p* .
M- 9 -
The financial impact of the decision to participate is for this
country:
p* is the hypothetical price ~in the non-member market which would
have been valid if the importing member country left the agree-
ID* ment and entered the non-member market, q . is the corresponding
quantity which would have been imported by the member country i
if it left the agreement.
For the importing non-member country, the welfare impact arising
from the decision to stay outside the agreement compared with an
entry is characterized by
P*
(9) AW = /
 M ID. (p) dp 1 0, if PN i p* .
The financial impact of the decision for an outsider status is
for this country
(10) AI. = pN q™. - p*
p* is the hypothetical price in the member market which would
have been valid if the importing non-member country joined the
ID*
agreement. qM. is the corresponding quantity which the non-mem-
ber country j would have imported in the case of joining the
agreement.
The welfare effect for an exporting member country k arising from









The financial impact of the decision to participate in the agree
ment is for the exporting member country:
AEk " PM^k
 + PN %
PM, is the minimum export price at which the exporting member
country starts to export the commodity, p* is the hypothetical
price in the non-member market which would have occurred if the
exporting member country left the agreement and offered its total
export supply on the non-member market. ES*, is the export supply
ES*
curve and g . the exported quantity of country k on the non-
member market in this hypothetical situation.
In order to measure national interests from the equations (1) to
(12) , it is additionally necessary to specify supply and demand
/
functions for the market under quotas. The following empirical
analysis is based on the assumption of loglinear supply and de-
mand functions.- 11 -
4. Identifying National Interests in the International Coffee
Agreement: Empirical Results for 1982 and 1983
The theoretical approach to measuring national interests in the
ICA will now be quantified for 1982 and 1983. These years have
been chosen because (i) the parallel-market problem showed up in
the 1980's, and (ii) 1982 and 1983 were the first years in which
the quota regulation prevailed permanently . The equations (1) to
(12) form the basis for the empirical analysis. These equations
contain observables as well as unobservables. Generally, the
variables characterizing the existing situation with agreement
can be taken from published sources (FAO; International Coffee
Organization 1983, 1985) . However, the prices and quantities in
the hypothetical situations (marked by *) cannot. Some of the
unobservable variables are taken from an empirical study on the
aggregate impacts of the ICA on the world market price, world
trade, world import expenditures and export earnings (Herrmann,
1986) . One basic result of this study is that the price in the
controlled coffee market increased due to policy by 47.4% in 1982
and by 16.7% in 1983. The actual price in the uncontrolled was
generally lower than in the controlled market. It was higher by
11.3% than the hypothetical world market price in 1982, whereas
it was lower by 27.2% than the hypothetical price in 1983 . The
calculated hypothetical price in a liberalized world coffee mar-
ket is taken from this study and will be used in the positive
approach for all countries. Moreover, the average prices in the
member market and in the non-member market are used as actual
prices for all countries in the positive and in the decision-
oriented approach. This procedure implies that the law of one
price is imposed on price formation in the coffee market.
4.1 Importing non-member countries
The measurement of national interests in the ICA is based on the
equations (2) , (5) , (9) and (10) for the importing non-member
ID* countries. In these equations, the unobservables q. , p* and
ID* qT.. have to be quantified besides p*. The hypothetical import
M3 XT}* jrj*
demand (q , q ) is calculated on the basis of point estimates
3 M;j- 12 -
for price elasticities of import demand that are taken from our
own econometric estimations of import demand functions . For p*,
the following assumption is made: p* = p*. This implies that the
current price in the controlled coffee market would still be
valid if the importing non-member country joined the agreement.
The assumption characterizes an export quota policy that is used
g
as a means for realizing a target price .
The empirical analysis shows that the results are significantly
influenced by the approach to measuring national interests in the
ICA. This holds true for the measurement of national interests in
financial and in welfare terms. The following major results can
be derived from Tables 1 and 2:
1. On average for 1982 and 1983, the importing non-member coun-
tries that imported in both years gained in economic welfare
due to the ICA compared with a hypothetical non-quota situa-
tion. In 1982 and 1983, all the importing non-member coun-
tries increased economic welfare by their decisions to stay
outside . instead of joining the agreement. As the price
elasticity of import demand is absolutely lower than unity
for most non-member countries, import expenditures of these
countries were reduced on average for both years. This re-
sult holds true independently of the measurement approach.
Despite these similarities in the results, the magnitudes of
median impacts differ strongly between the two approaches.
In financial terms, the export quota policy influenced na-
tional interests of most importing non-member countries more
positively from a decision-oriented than from a positive
point of view. On average for 1982 and 1983, a cross-country
comparison shows a median decrease in import expenditures
compared with a liberalized world market by 1.6 mill.$ or
6.5%. The median decrease in import expenditures compared
with the hypothetical situation of participating in the ICA
was more than three times as high: -5.8 mill.$ or -25.6%.
The magnitude of the welfare impact was again much higher on
the basis of the decision-oriented as against the positive
approach. On average for 1982 and 1983, the cross-country- 13 -
Table 1: National Interests of Importing Non-member Countries in the International Coffee Agreement with Respect to Im-










































































































































































































































































a The calculation is based on equation (5) for the positive approach and on (10) for the decision-oriented approach. The
price elasticities of import demand, underlying the calculation of the hypothetical imports, were taken from loglinear
import demand functions which were estimated econctnetrically. The price elasticities used are : -1.30 (Korea, P.D.R.
of); -1.20 (Turkey); -0.88 (Hongkong); -0.63 (Jordan); -0.57 (Morocco); -0.50 (South Africa, Israel); -0.37 (U.S.S.R.);
-0.25 (Poland); -0.19 (Czecholovakia); 0 (German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Romania, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Senegal,
Saudi-Arabia, Syria, Chile).
For these countries, the price coefficients of linear import demand functions were used to calculate imports in the
hypothetical situation. The price coefficients used are: -3.5106 (Somalia); -2.4010 (Sudan); -0.6823 (Tunisia); -1.2654
(Lebanon); -6.0685 (Argentina).
c No imports recorded.
Source: Own calculations with data from FAD and International Coffee Organization (1983, 1985) by use of the method des-
cribed in the text.- 14 -
comparison shows a median increase in economic welfare of
2.6 mill.$ in the quota situation compared with a hypothe-
tical liberalized world market. The median welfare increase
compared with a hypothetical participation is about four
times as high: +10.9 mill.$.
2. The empirical analysis not only shows that the measurement
approach may influence the magnitude of the observed impacts
on national economic objectives. It also shows that the
signs of the policy impact may differ due to the measurement
approach. One approach may indicate that national interests
are positively affected, whereas the other approach may
indicate the reverse. The results for 1982 illustrate the
point. In 1982, a liberalized world market would have been
depressed by a huge oversupply and the world price would
have been even lower than the existing price in the uncon-
trolled coffee market. Hence, the median importing non-
member country realized an increase in import expenditures
of 1.5 mill. $ and a decrease in economic welfare of 2.6
mill.$ compared with the free-trade situation. It realized,
however, a decrease in import expenditures of 4.8 mill.$ and
an increase in economic welfare of 7.4 mill.$ as a conse-
quence of staying outside instead of joining the agreement.
The positive approach indicates a negative impact on na-
tional interests of the median importing non-member country,
whereas the decision-oriented approach indicates a positive
effect.
3. An analysis of the individual country cases makes the im-
portance of the measurement approach even more obvious. Both
approaches agree that the national impacts are the highest
for some "large" coffee-importing countries among the non-
members like the German Democratic Republic, Algeria,
Czechoslovakia and Hungary. However, the magnitudes of the
impacts differ widely according to the measurement approach.
On average for 1982 and 1983, the decision-oriented approach
shows the highest welfare gains and the strongest decrease
in import expenditures, of 78.3 mill.$ respectively, for the- 15 -
Table 2: National Interests of Importing Non-member Countries in the International Coffee Agreement with Respect to Eco-
















































































































































































































The calculation is based on equation (2) for the positive approach and (9) for the decision-oriented approach. The
price elasticities given in footnote (a) of Table 1 were used.
For these countries, the price coefficients of linear import demand functions given in footnote (b) of Table 1 were
used to calculate hypothetical imports.
No iinports recorded.
Source: Own calculations with data from FAO and International Coffee Organization (1983, 1985) by use of the method des-
cribed in the text.- 16 -
German Democratic Republic. The national interests of this
country are much less influenced according to the positive
approach. The German Democratic Republic realized a policy-
induced welfare gain of "only" 20.6 mill.$ and a fall in
import expenditures of the same amount, compared with a
liberalized world market. This extreme case shows that the
change in the benchmark situation leads to a difference in
the observed financial and welfare impacts that amounts to
nearly 60 mill.$.
4.2 Importing member countries
The measurement of the importing member countries' national in-
terests in the ICA is based on the equations (1) , (4) , (7) and
ID* ID*
(8). In these equations, the unobservables q. , p* and q . have
to be quantified besides p*. The hypothetical import demand is
again calculated on the basis of point estimates of import demand
taken from econometrically estimated import demand functions . A
methodological problem is the calculation of p*. A withdrawal of
the importing country i will shift the import demand curve in the
controlled coffee market to the left and in the uncontrolled
market by the same amount to the right. Given a fixed target
price under the quota system, quotas have to be lowered in the
controlled market due to the withdrawal. Oversupply in the con-
trolled market increases. It is assumed that a given share of the
additional oversupply will be transmitted to the uncontrolled
market and shift the export supply curve to the right. As the
import-demand shift will be stronger than the export-supply
shift, p* will exceed p . It is assumed that the International
Coffee Organization would have the means to separate the market
segments in each case, so that the hypothetical price in the
uncontrolled market could even rise above the controlled market's
price. Based on this theoretical background, p* is calculated for
9 each importing member country with the Newton-Raphson algorithm .
The empirical results are shown in Tables 3 and 4. The calculated
national interests in the ICA are again strongly affected by the
measurement approach. The following major results can be derived:- 17 -
Table 3: National Interests of importing Menier Countries in the International Coffee Agreement with Respect to Import



















































































































































































































































The calculation is based on equation (4) for the positive approach and on (9) for the decision-oriented approach. The
price elasticities of import demand, underlying the calculation of imports in the hypothetical situation, were taken
fran own econometric estimates of loglinear import demand functions. The price elasticities used are: -0.41 (Portugal);
-0.40 (Switzerland); -0.39 (New Zealand, USA); -0.37 (Greece); -0.32 (Sweden); -0.31 (Netherlands); -0.28 (Belgium);
-0.27 (Austria); -0.26 (Australia); -0.21 (Denmark, Canada); -0.19 (Italy); -0.17 (Norway); -0.16 (United Kingdom);
-0.10 (France); -0.09 (F.R. Germany); 0 (Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Spain, Yugoslavia, Japan).
The parentheses indicate the strongest changes in import expenditures on the basis of the decision-oriented approach.
These values are shown primarily for illustrative purposes, as it cannot be expected that under a withdrawal of the
major importers the assumed model would remain unchanged. ( ) and (( )) indicate that the import expenditures under the
hypothetical situation of a withdrawal from the ICA would be more than double (three times as high as) the existing
import expenditures in the case of the country's participation in the ICA.
Source: Own calculations with data from FAO and International Coffee Organization (1983, 1985), by use of the method des-
cribed in the text.- 18 -
1. The positive approach shows a uniformly negative influence
of the ICA on the national interests of importing member
countries. As coffee prices on the controlled market were
raised above the liberalized world market price, economic
welfare decreased in 1982 and 1983 for all importing member
countries. Moreover, the export quota policy raised import
expenditures, since import demand of the member countries is
price-inelastic. The results of a decision-oriented approach
are less uniform. Under the model's assumptions, the price
in the uncontrolled market rises if an importing member
country withdraws from the ICA. For some large countries,
the price increase would have been so strong that the hypo-
thetical price in the uncontrolled market exceeded the
existing price in the controlled market. 16 (6) countries
lowered their import expenditures and increased economic
welfare in 1982 (1983) by participating in the ICA instead
of leaving it. For 7 (17) countries, the reverse holds true.
On average for 1982 and 1983, 11 countries experienced a
positive and 12 countries a negative impact on national
interests due to their membership decision. On average for
1982 and 1983, the importing member countries experienced an
increase in import expenditures and a loss in economic wel-
fare of 41.2 mill.$ as a median impact according to the
positive approach. The median impact on import expenditures
in percentage terms was +23.2%. On the basis of the deci-
sion-oriented approach, the median impact is much smaller,
with an increase in import expenditures and a decrease in
economic welfare of 0.6 mill.$. The median impacts are cru-
cially different for 1982 and 1983, with an increase in
economic welfare and a decrease in import expenditures of
35.2 mill.$ in 1982 and a fall in economic welfare of 19.5
mill.$ and a rise in import expenditures of 12.3 mill.$ in
1983.
2. From analyzing the national differences between the positive
and the decision-oriented approach, it can be seen that the
aggregate results for 1982 and 1983 move in the same (oppo-- 19 -
Table 4: National Interests of Importing Member Countries in the. International Coffee Agreement with Respect to Eco-




























































































































































































The calculation is based on equation (1) for the positive approach and on (7) for the decision-oriented approach. The
price elasticities given in footnote (a) of Table 3 were used.
The parentheses indicate the strongest changes in economic welfare on the basis of the decision-oriented approach.
These values are shown primarily for illustrative purposes, as it cannot be expected that the model would remain un-
changed in the case a withdrawal by the major importers. ( ) indicates that the change in economic welfare due to a
withdrawal of the importing country from the ICA would be more than double the import expenditures in the existing
situation of a membership in the ICA.
Source: Own calculations with data from FAO and International Coffee Organization (1983, 1985) by use of the method des-
cribed in the text.- 20 -
site) direction for 12 (13) countries. Each importing member
country is negatively affected in financial and welfare
terms according to the positive approach. The highest wel-
fare losses accrued to the largest coffee importers, i.e.
the USA (-71.1 mill.$), the FR Germany (-342 mill.$), France
(-216 mill.$), Italy (-163 mill.$) and Japan (-123 mill.$).
On.the basis of the decision-oriented approach, 12 countries
again experienced negative impacts on their national in-
terests. The highest welfare losses were realized by
Yugoslavia (-18 mill.$), followed by Norway, Australia,
Greece, Portugal, Austria, Switzerland, Denmark, New Zea-
land, Finland, Cyprus and Ireland. These countries lost in
economic welfare not only as a consequence of the ICA com-
pared with a liberalized world market but also due to their
decisions to stay inside instead of leaving the ICA. The
other 13 countries, however, gained in economic welfare due
to their membership decisions although the ICA worsened
their welfare positions compared with the situation of a
liberalized world market. The largest member countries,
having the highest welfare losses according to the positive
approach, realized the highest welfare gains according to
the decision-oriented approach.
An important conclusion from the empirical analysis is that some
importing members of the ICA gained from their decision to parti-
cipate in the price-raising agreement, independently of the wel-
fare-decreasing impact of the agreement's introduction on an
otherwise liberalized world market.
4.3 Exporting member countries
The measurement of the exporting member countries' national in-
terests in the ICA is based on the equations (3) , (6) , (9) and
ES* ES* (12) . In these equations, the unobservables qk , qNk and p*k
had to be quantified besides p*. An additional difficulty in the
exporting countries' case is that no point on the planned export
supply curve will be realized if the quota policy is binding.
Therefore, the export supply function in the hypothetical situ-- 21 -
ation without quota policy has to be computed, too. Generally,
the results of empirical analyses did not seem reliable enough
for use in modeling these hypothetical export supply functions or
for providing price elasticities of export supply. Hence, it is
assumed that the short-run price elasticity of export supply is
zero and that each individual country exported the difference
between planned aggregate export supply and the export quota to
the non-member market. This implies that the policy-induced wel-
fare changes are equal to the changes in export earnings . As
the indirect sanctioning of sales to the non-member market
possibly reduced exports of the individual countries below free-
trade exports, the sum of exports to the two market segments
indicates the minimum export supply in the hypothetical non-quota
situation. Therefore, possible welfare losses from limiting
planned aggregate supply are excluded, and the resulting welfare
changes must be regarded as maximum welfare gains or minimum
*
welfare losses. Based on these assumptions, p., is calculated
9
with the Newton-Raphson algorithm .
The empirical results are shown in Table 5 for 46 exporting mem-
ber countries of the ICA. Again, the calculated national in-
terests are strongly influenced by the measurement approach. The
main results are:
1. On average for 1982 and 1983, each individual exporting
member country increased its export earnings and its econo-
mic welfare as a consequence of the ICA. Moreover, each
exporting member gained in both years from its decision to
participate in the agreement instead of leaving it. Had it
left the agreement, it would have caused a price fall for
those exports that were actually covered by the export quota
scheme. Although the median impacts according to the posi-
tive and the decision-oriented approach moved in the same
direction in 1982 and 1983, the impact shown by the deci-
sion-oriented approach was much stronger than that documen-
ted by the positive approach. On average for 1982 and 1983,
the median exporting member country realized an increase in- 22 -
Table 5: National Interests of
Earnings and Economic
Ei:porting Member Countries in the I
Welfare , 1982 and 1983 (mill. $)





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































The calculations are based on equations (6) for the positive approach and on (12) for the decision-oriented approach.
The assumed short-run price elasticities of export supply are zero and it is assumed for each individual country that
the actual exports to the member and the non-member market would be equal to the hypothetical exports in the situation
without quotas. Therefore, the calculations also indicate maximum welfare gains (minimum welfare losses) with respect
to' the equations (3) and (9).
Source: Own calculations with data from FAO and International Coffee Organization (1983, 1985) by use of the method des-
cribed in the text.- 23
export earnings c id economic welfare of 17.3 mill.$ compared
with a liberalized world-market situation. In contrast, the
median exporter raised its export earnings and its economic
welfare due to the decision to participate in the agreement
by nearly double: +34.1 mill.$. The median impacts in per-
centage terms are +26.9 and +76.9% respectively. This strong
difference between the decision-oriented and the positive
approach was mainly caused by the results for 1983 . In
this year, the actual price in the non-member market was
lower than the hypothetical price in a uniform world market.
If an exporter leaves the agreement in such a situation,
this will further depress prices in the non-member market.
The gain in export earnings and economic welfare as a con-
sequence of staying inside the agreement will become higher
than the gains which arise from the ICA compared with a non-
quota situation.
The results at the national level show that large exporting
member countries realized the highest absolute gains in
export earnings and economic welfare due to the ICA. Brazil,
Colombia, Ivory Coast, Uganda and El Salvador ranked highest
on average for 1982 and 1983. These were also the countries
realizing the highest welfare gains from their decisions to
participate instead of leaving the agreement. Generally, the
difference in the calculated national impact between the
positive and the decision-oriented approach is much higher
for the large coffee exporters than for the smaller ones.
The reason is that a withdrawal by a large coffee exporter
would depress the price in the thin non-member market so
*
much that p , would be much lower than for small exporters.
This leads to a relatively large dispersion of hypothetical
prices according to the decision-oriented approach, whereas
a uniform hypothetical world market price in the non-quota
situation underlies the positive approach. Two interesting
results have to be added at the national level. Firstly, the
welfare impacts of the ICA are negative for some exporting
member countries, even in the short-run framework of the- 24 -
presented approach. The cases of Angola, India and Liberia,
whose quotas covered only a small share of their exports in
1983, illustrate the point. Secondly, the impact shown by
the decision-oriented approach may be less favourable than
under the positive approach, if the hypothetical price in a
uniform world market is lower than the actual price in the
non-member market. The case of small exporters like Bolivia,
for which pN, would still have been lower than p* in 1982,
is an example.- 25 -
5. On the Sensitivity of the Results
Sensitivity analyses for the importing countries show that the
presented results are relatively stable when plausible alter-
native price elasticities and functional forms of import demand
12
functions are taken into account . Generally, the welfare im-
pacts are less sensitive than the impacts on import expenditures.
Another assumption influences the calculation of national in-
terests in the ICA more strongly: the law of one price. The pre-
sented results are based on this assumption. A uniform price is
assumed for the member and the non-member market in the existing
quota situation and for the hypothetical unified world market in
the non-quota situation. This implies that the calculated impacts
of the ICA are unbiased for the "average" country, but not neces-
sarily for each individual country. It is well-known that dif-
ferent coffee qualities are sold at different prices. In tenden-
cy, the prices of an importer who buys high-quality (low-quality)
coffee will be above (below) average. The calculated policy im-
pacts may be affected by ignoring these quality differences.
Table 6 shows sensitivity results for the two largest coffee
importers, the USA and the FR Germany, that take deviations from
the law of one price into account. The USA (FR Germany) usually
buys coffee at a lower (higher) price than the average world
import price. Considering this, the impacts are weaker for the
USA and higher for the FR Germany compared with the basic model
that assumes the law of one price. On average for 1982 and 1983,
the ICA-induced increase in U.S. import expenditures was 433.7
instead of 478.7 mill.$, for the FR Germany 311.0 instead of
256.1 mill.$. The welfare loss for the USA was 711 compared with
784.8 mill.$ under the law-of-one-price assumption, for the FR
Germany 341.8 compared with 281.4 mill.$. Of course, the general
conclusion that the ICA caused substantial resource transfers
away from the importing member countries remains valid.- 26 -
The sensitivity analysis suggests that it would be an important
step to further improve the presented approach by explicitly
introducing the different coffee qualities into the model. Then,
national interests in the ICA could be derived in a refined way
by taking into account quality-induced national price differen-
ces.
Table 6: Sensitivity Analysis about the Impact of the ICA on Import Expendi-
tures and Welfare in the USA and the FR Germany, <t> 1982/83 (Posi-
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Model 1 is the basic model assuming the law of one price.
Model 2 takes into account that national inport prices may deviate from
average irrport prices, e.g. due to quality differences. The actual prices
are taken from FAO statistics and the hypothetical prices are calculated
with a regression function between national (p.) and world import prices
(p ) estimated for 1966-81:
USA: inp. = -1.8051 + 1.2214 in 6 ;
1 W
FR Germany: in p\ = 0.7303 + 0.9170 Jin p .
1 W
Sources: Own calculations with data from the sources cited in Tables 3 and 4.- 27 -
6. Summary and Conclusions
This article has presented a methodological basis for measuring
national interests in a price-raising international commodity
agreement. A positive and a decision-oriented approach were dis-
tinguished and used to measure national interests of importing
member and non-member countries and of exporting member countries
in the ICA. National interests in the ICA differ significantly
due to the measurement approach. On average for 1982 and 1983,
the main results are:
1. The ICA led to a welfare loss for the importing member coun-
tries compared^ with a hypothetical free-market situation,
whereas the exporting member countries received a welfare
gain as well as the importing non-member countries. Import
expenditures increased for member countries and decreased
for most non-member countries. Export earnings of member
countries increased due to the ICA.
2. From a decision-oriented point of view, the actual decision
of most countries on their participation or non-participa-
tion in the ICA could be justified. All importing non-member
countries gained from their decision to stay outside the
ICA; all exporting countries gained from their decision to
participate. In the case of importing member countries, some
large members realized welfare gains due to their decision
to participate, smaller members would have increased
economic welfare by leaving the agreement.
In future research, the presented approach can be extended in
various directions. National interests could be measured in terms
of multiple objective functions, including more economic goals
than economic welfare and financial criteria as well as non-eco-
nomic goals. Impacts of the ICA on price stability could be taken
into account and impacts on other sectors of the economy. The
method could be elaborated from an ex-post to an ex-ante approach
under uncertainty. In the decision-oriented approach, the reac-- 28 -
tions of other countries to decisions by those leaving or joining
the agreement could be modeled by use of game theory. Finally,
the method could be applied for measuring national interests in
other commodity agreements and other instruments of international
economic policy.- 29
Footnotes
On the structure of the world coffee market, see Marshall
(1983), pp. 8 et seq. For a description of the International
Coffee Agreement, see International Coffee Organization
(1982) and Gordon-Ashworth (1984) , pp. 205 et seq. For an
overview on the history of coffee control, see Fisher
(1972) . A recent analysis of the world coffee economy, in-
cluding a discussion of the dual-market problem under the
1983 International Coffee Agreement, is provided by Econo-
mist, Intelligence Unit (1987) .
A purely terms-of-trade stabilizing export quota scheme,
which differs crucially from the rules of the International
Coffee Agreement, was recommended in the Kaldor plan. See
Kaldor (1964), pp. 112 et seq.
One could argue that a price-increasing effect will not
necessarily exist in the medium-run, as oversupply from the
depressed period with quotas will enter the market in the
unregulated boom period. The average price could then remain
unaltered compared with a free-trade situation. However, the
outward shift of the export supply curve in the boom period
will be lower than the inward shift in the depressed period.
This is due to the fact that parts of oversupply in coffee
are shifted to the unregulated market in the depression
period and are not stored for a boom period. Hence, the
International Coffee Agreement is also price-increasing over
time.
The measurement of welfare impacts is based on the tradi-
tional surplus concept that is presented and extended in
Just/Hueth/Schmitz (1982) .
In the 19 70 's, the quota mechanism was not used, as market
prices were higher than the agreement's target prices. The
rules were in force, however, in the 1960's. For a des-
cription of international coffee policy in the 1960's, see
Fisher (1972). The more recent development of intervention
in the coffee market is described in FAO, Commodity Review
and Outlook, Rome, various years.
It can be shown theoretically that a quota policy in a con-
trolled market may increase or decrease the market price in
an uncontrolled market compared with the situation of a
liberalized uniform market. For a proof, see Herrmann
(1987a).
The estimated import demand functions for non-member coun-
tries and member countries are reported in Herrmann (1987b).
Such an export quota policy implies that the global quota in
the controlled market has to be increased by the amount the
new member country demands additionally at the target price.- 30 -
9 A description of the Newton-Raphson algorithm is given in
Barnett/Ziegler (1985), pp. 668 et seq. The methodological
procedure is shown in detail in Herrmann (1987b), section
3.2.4 for the importing member countries.
10 It can be shown in this special case that equation (3) re-
duces to (6) .and equation (9) to (12) . The proof is avail-
able from the author upon request.
11 If the actual price in the non-member market is higher than
the hypothetical world market price (p > p*) , it is pos-
sible that the hypothetical price p*, would be higher or
lower than p*. The results for 1982 are an example. There
was p* > p* for small exporters and p* < p* for large
exporters. Had a large coffee exporter withdrawn from the
ICA, it would have depressed the price in the thin non-
member market below the level of the hypothetical world
market price in the non-quota situation.
12 For a detailed analysis, see Herrmann (1987b), section
3.2.6.- 31 -
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